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NOTE
ALABAMA & COUSHATTA TRIBES V. BIG SANDY
SCHOOL DISTRICT: THE RIGHT OF NATIVE

AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS TO WEAR
LONG HAIR
Timothy S. Zahniser*
Our people are eager to learn. They are proud of being
American. They are proud of being Indians.'
After being confined to the back burner of legal issues for a number of
years, Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v. Trustees of the Big Sandy School
Distric reintroduced an issue which was very much boiling over in the
Federal courts in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that time, public school
regulations which prohibited male students from wearing long hair were
challenged as violating constitutional rights.' These claims were usually met
by determined school boards and officials who argued a state interest in
maintaining a proper public education. Over the past two decades, many
courts have faced this issue but have not come to any consensus. These
holdings illustrate a wide variety of judicial approaches. The dispute quickly
developed and involved a multitude of so-called "long hair cases." Many
jurists believed that the long hair issue was among the most confusing and
unsettled issues in American jurisprudence.! When the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in New Rider v. Board of Education,5 Justice William 0. Douglas

* Third-year law student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Statement of Earl Old Person, Chairman of the Blackfeet Tribe, Montana, Against the

Omnibus Bill (1966), in OF UTMosT GOOD FArm 338, 340 (Vine Deloria Jr., ed., 1972).
2. 817 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Tex. 1993).

3. See Recent Cases, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1702, 1703 n.3 (1971).
4. One court remarked:
[lI]t appears that long hair cases are among the most confusing and unsettled in the
federal courts. What is arbitrary and capricious to one court is reasonable and
rational to another court. Even more unsettled is the very question which must be
answered before the merits of the questions are reached, that being whether there
is a "right" under the federal Constitution, no matter which provision therein, for
a student to wear long hair.
Valdes v. Monroe County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 325 F. Supp. 572,574 (S.D. Fla. 1971). Some
other courts were good natured about the subject: "Tlhis court undertakes to comb the tangled
roots of this hairy issue." Sims v. Colfax Community Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485, 486 (S.D.
Iowa 1970).

5. 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973).
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summed up his concerns in a dissenting opinion by stating, "I have noted the
deep division among the Circuits on this issue, and have thought that it is an

issue of particular personal interest to many and of considerable constitutional
importance."6

To some, long hair may seem to be a trivial issue. What is not trivial is
a study of Big Sandy and its predecessors, which provides an excellent

academic study of constitutional personal liberty. This note examines the Big
Sandy case, and the court's approach to the constitutional questions raised.
The Big Sandy court's discussion of the unique issue of religious freedom of
wearing long hair in relation to school regulations is also examined.7 This
note concludes with an analysis of Big Sandy, a criticism of the so-called
"sincerity test," and the abuse the test presents.
L Challenges to Public School HairLength Regulations

A variety of constitutional rights may be burdened by a hair length
regulation. Many constitutional arguments have been successfully used in
challenging public school hair length or grooming regulations. The most often
used (or abused, as some courts would view)' will be discussed herein.
A. Due Process

Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, no
state may deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.' Recognizing the right to wear one's hair as he wishes as a right

6. New Rider v. Board of Educ., 414 U.S. 1097, 1098 (1973) (Douglas J., dissenting).
7. Only a very few cases involve students claiming a religious right to wear long hair in
public schools. The plaintiffs in New Rider claimed a violation of their free expression of
religion. New Rider, 480 F.2d at 695. Chief Justice Lewis, concurring in this opinion, considered
evidence presenting the religious aspects of long hair among the Pawnee Tribe as insignificant:
"Their present contention of religious oppression rises no higher under this record than a desire
to express pride in their heritage through wearing long braided hair. Their desire so to do is
unCerstandable but not a constitutionally protected right." Id. at 700-01.
8. See Zeller v. Donegal Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1975). In upholding
a high school hair length regulation in the face of a constitutional claim, the court showed its
distaste for this type of case: "mhe proliferation of claims with exotic concepts of real or
imrgined constitutional deprivations may very well dilute protections now assured basic rights.
We have a genuine fear of 'trivialization' of the Constitution." Id. at 607. The court continues
with an ominous warning, that the Constitution must not be
seized upon on wholesale fashion, recklessly or indiscriminately. Otherwise in
every case where the defendant has acted under color of state law, the visible rules
and principles of traditional disciplines of state law may be discarded for
comparatively imprecise newly-formed dimensions of the Fourteenth Amendments
"due process" and "liberty" concepts. Predictability and reckonability of societal
regulations will lessen, and order and regularity of the law will suffer.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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provides a
implicit in "liberty," the First Circuit in Richards v. Thurston"
analysis
of
that
concept.
thorough
The Richards court pointed out that "momentous" acts are protected," that
is, "liberty" includes the rights of parents to educate their children in private
schools, to travel to foreign countries, 3 and to travel interstate. 4 The
Richardscourt did not consider the issue trivial, even though it was cognizant
of the fact that this was an element of life which had no direct bearing on the
ability of others to enjoy their liberty." On the contrary, the Richards court
held that the right of self control and "to be let alone" is the most "sacred" of
all rights.
The Richards court warned that a narrow interpretation of liberty might
result in a uniform national hairstyle.' While the right to wear long hair may
appear trivial, the court noted that the right to assembly was considered "mere
surplusage" by some during the debate surrounding the formulation of the
First Amendment. The Richards court believed that there is a "sphere of
personal liberty," and the government's power to intrude upon it is limited."
The Richards court concluded the discussion by stating that the Founding
Fathers believed it unnecessary to include an amendment about personal

appearance," and that "within the commodious concept of liberty embracing

freedoms great and small, is the right to wear one's hair as he wishes."2'
Accordingly, other courts have recognized the freedom to govern one's2
hairstyle as a right retained by the people, deserving due process protection. 2

424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
Id. at 1284.
Id. (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).
Id. (citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958)).
Id. (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 759 (1966)).
Id. at 1285.
The Richards court was explicit:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless under clear and
unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley, "The right to one's
person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone."
Id. (citing Union Pacific Ry. v. Butsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)); e.g., Stull v. School Bd. of
Western Beaver Junior-Senior High Sch., 459 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1972), overruled by Zeller v.
Donegal Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1975).
17. Richards, 424 F.2d at 1285 ("[A] narrower view of liberty in a free society might ...
allow a state to require a conventional coiffure of all its citizens, a governmental power not
unknown in European history.").
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971); see also Berryman v. Hien, 329
F. Supp. 616, 618 (D. Idaho 1971) (holding that personal appearance, including hair length, is
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
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This right is present even for public school students. " The right to be secure

in one's person was the basis for other holdings.' Every individual should
have the right to express his individuality and personality.'
In Breen v. Kahl, the right to wear long hair was compared to the right
of a married couple to use contraceptivesY The Breen court held that human

dignity and individuality would be violated, and that the highly protected
freedom of presenting one's self to the world should not be impaired, absent

a cDmpelling state interest.'
A long hair case can involve not only substantive due process but
procedural due process as well. The "right to be heard" is violated where a

long-haired student is expelled or suspended for a lengthy or indefinite time
without at least an informal hearing.' A due process violation occurs when

school officials, in the absence of any reasonable justification, suspend a
student for no more compelling reason than his long hair."
B. Freedom of Speech
There appears to be some diversity among courts on where to classify the
"freedom" to govern one's hair length, if indeed that freedom is found to exist.
As previously stated, some courts identify long hair as a right included in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of liberty.3' Other courts have considered
this a right retained by the people; one of the personal liberties held for every
individual under the Ninth Amendment?2 From this, some long-haired
one of these personal liberties, subject only to reasonable regulation by the state in matters of
legitimate state interest); Seal v. Mertz, 338 F. Supp. 945, 950 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that the
wearing of long hair is a "liberty" within meaning of Fourteenth Amendment).
23. Bishop, 450 F.2d at 1075; see also Seal, 338 F. Supp. at 951 (holding that the wearing
of long hair by anyone, including public school students, is a "liberty" within meaning of
Fouiteenth Amendment).
24. See Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, .783 (4th Cir. 1972).
25. Sims v. Colfax Community Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485, 488 (S.D. Iowa 1970).
26. 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
27. Id. at 706 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)) (noting that the
Griswold Court held the freedom to use contraceptives to be a "highly protected freedom").
28. Id.The Breen court held that
[The freedom of an adult male or female to present himself or herself physically
to the world in the manner of his or her choice is a highly protected freedom...
For the state to impair this freedom, in the absence of a compelling,
subordinating interest in doing so, would offend a widely shared concept of human
dignity, would assault personality and individuality, would undermine identity and
would invade human 'being'. It would violate a basic value implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty, it would deprive a man or a woman of liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. (citation omitted).
29. Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189, 1195 (10th Cir. 1974).
:0. Berryman v. Hien, 329 F. Supp. 616, 620 (D. Idaho 1971).
31. See supra notes 9-30 and accompanying text.
:2. Berryman, 329 F. Supp. at 618. But see Stull v. School Bd. of Western Beaver Junior-
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plaintiffs have attempted to gain the higher protection offered by the First
Amendment by claiming their long hair as a "freedom of expression," which
may not fall under the First Amendment.3 While recognizing that a
symbolic expression of individuality may deserve some constitutional
protection, it may not be within the First Amendment.'
When plaintiffs allege that their long hair is "symbolic speech," courts must
utilize a First Amendment analysis." Courts may be reluctant to recognize
such First Amendment protection, in part because when such a paramount
right as freedom of speech is violated, federal courts are required to act
swiftly and give thorough and exhaustive consideration to all issues
presented. Plaintiffs in a long hair case, attempting to show that their
hairstyle is a form of symbolic speech, must show some inoral, sociological,
political, religious, or ideological viewpoint?7 The scope of symbolic speech
has been very limited:" "We cannot accept the view that an apparently
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."3 One court
found elements of "speech" and "nonspeech" combined. 4 Some courts have
recognized that long hair could have communicative intent, containing an
element of expression and speech, though that intent may be only a general
disdain for the "establishment."41 Even when such a communication is found,
it is not usually seen as sufficiently communicative to warrant the full
protection of the First Amendment.42
The long-haired student could make a showing that his long hair represents
a symbolic expression or an idea.43 A student's long hair can come under the
First Amendment umbrella if such a showing is made (that his hair represents,
say, a political viewpoint).4 This was a common argument during the years

Senior High Sch., 459 F.2d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that without further guidance from

Supreme Court, court of appeals ought not to expand Ninth Amendment beyond notions applied
to right of marital privacy), overruled on other grounds, Zeller v. Donegal Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 517 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1975).
33. See Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967); see also Brick v. Board of
Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (D. Colo. 1969) (stating- such symbolic expressions of

individuality are not within First Amendment).
34. Brick v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (D. Colo. 1969).
35. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969)
(holding that a symbolic act is within the Free Speech Clause, and is closely akin to pure speech
and entitled to First Amendment protection).

36. Id.
37. Brick, 305 F. Supp. at 1319.
38. Id.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 1319-20 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 705 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1283 (1st Cir. 1970).
Id.
Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 1981).
Church v. Board of Educ., 339 F. Supp. 538, 541 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
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circa 1970, when federal courts, heard most of the long hair cases. These
students also frequently relied on the recently decided Tinker v. Des Moines
4 In Tinker, a school policy which
Independent Community School District.
prohibited students from wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam
War was found to violate the First Amendment, because such symbolic speech
was considered akin to pure speech. Most courts believed any reliance by
such students was misplaced, since the Supreme Court specifically
distinguished Tinker from regulations on hairstyle
Many courts saw long hair as a fad and believed that it symbolized
nothing. 4 A symbol is a vehicle by which a concept is transmitted from one
to amother, and to be entitled to First Amendment protection, that symbol must
represent a specific idea or viewpoint."' Further, that idea must make a
significant contribution to the "marketplace of ideas" to warrant First
Amendment protection.' Long hair is usually viewed as not meeting the
specificity requirement to constitute symbolic speech.
C. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause"' requires that people under like
circumstances be given equal protection in the enjoyment of personal rights
and the protection and redress of wrongs." This means that no class of
persons shall be denied the same protection enjoyed by another class of
persons. Some courts presiding over cases challenging hair length regulations
have found the Equal Protection Clause to apply. This is because any
limitation of the right to wear such hair, and the promulgation and
enfDrcement of the school regulations prohibiting such right, are done by a
state actor: the public school official." An equal protection violation does
not occur merely because only one school out of many in a district has a hair
length regulation.' It has been noted that an inequitable application of health
and safety objectives can constitute a denial of equal protection, if they are
applied only to male students."5

45. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
46. Id. at 505-06.

47. ld. at 507-08.
48. Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524, 527 (E.D. La. 1967).
49. Id.
50. Brick v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (D. Colo. 1969).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
equal protection of the laws.")
'52. See Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v. Trustees of the Big Sandy Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp.
1319, 1336 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
:53. Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972).
:54. Brick, 305 F. Supp. at 1321.
:55. Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1266 (7th Cir. 1970). The court stated:
[Alithough girls engage in substantially the same activities in gym and biology
classes, only boys have been required to cut their hair in order to attend classes.
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Classification of students by the length of their hair also appears to be a
violation of equal protection, unless a reasonable basis for the classification
can be discerned. Placing violators of the hair length regulations apart from
the other students, such as in a detention study hall, could constitute an equal
protection violation. If the practice is imposed to induce compliance with the
regulation, the one subjected to the detention should have the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Justification of hair length regulation through allegations of public
disapproval, or student body disapproval if such regulations are not enforced,
has not been viewed favorably by courts, such as in Turley v. Adel
Community School District.' A student's constitutional rights may not be
forfeited simply because his fellow students object to the exercise of such
rights." The court in Turley stated, "Such a precedent would result in
nothing more than mob tyranny."59 When the defendants in Turley attempted
to put forth the "public wants it" argument, the court said this was analogous
to another argument proposed following the Brown v. Board of Education"
decision. The Little Rock School Board had asked to delay desegregation of
a school, arguing that "extreme public hostility" should allow for a delay'
Also quoting Brown, the court in New Rider v. Board of Education" put

forth the ideal: "[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments."' However, the New Rider court did not find merit
in the equal protection argument, stating that uniform regulations are
necessary due to student diversity."
The Equal Protection Clause permits a wide scope of discretion in enacting
laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than another.'
However, the court fails to explain how a uniform haircut will perpetuate the
Although classification has been held constitutional in certain circumstances,

defendants have offered no reasons why health and safety objectives are not
equally applicable to high school girls.
Id. (citations omitted).
56. Seal v. Mertz. 338 F. Supp. 945, 951 n.7 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
57. 322 F. Supp. 402 (S.D. Iowa 1971).

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 410.
Id.
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Turley, 322 F. Supp. at 410 (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I, 12 (1958)).
480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973).
Id. at 699 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ.. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
Id. The court stated:
Only by amalgamating children of various races, color cultural, ethnical and
environmental backgrounds can the public schools become the effective
"marketplace of ideas" for the benefit of all students. Common sense dictates that
some uniform regulations are necessary in order to maintain order, spirit,
scholarship, pride and discipline in the operation of a school system.

65. Id.
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ideals espoused by them. This allowance of classification, justified by the

court in New Rider, is illogical.
I. The Balance: State Interests v. PersonalLiberties

Since courts recognize that at least some individual liberty is held by a
student who wishes to choose his hairstyle,6 courts must look to the

challenged regulation to determine if such regulation is reasonable.67 This is
done by balancing the interest of the-student in engaging in the particular

prohibited activity (wearing long hair), against the State's interest in
prohibiting that activity."
The question of whether there is an outweighing state interest justifying an
intrusion upon personal liberty-was answered by the court in Richards v.

Thurston,' by applying three considerations: (1) the nature of the liberty
asserted; (2) the context in which it is asserted; and (3) the extent to which
the intrusion is confined to the legitimate public interest to be secured."
The interest of the State is generally described as the need to have an
orderly and efficient educational system.7' The interest in educating the

children of this nation has been classified as "compelling."'
This compelling reason, wrote one court, "is obvious."7 Therefore, school
boards are able to argue that the freedom to wear long hair in school should

be circumscribed because "[t]hat which so interferes or hinders the state in
providing the best education possible for its people, must be eliminated or
circumscribed as needed. This is true even when that which is condemned is

the exercise of a constitutionally protected right."'" According to some
courts, the "compelling reason" is enough to infringe upon the constitutional

rights of free exercise of speech, press, assembly, and religion." In stating
that student liberty is not absolute, one court rationalized school regulation by
noting that schools set standards for grading and promulgate rules for the
conducting of courses. 6 The fact that schools have a structure seems to infer

6. Sims v. Colfax Community Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485, 487 (S.D. Iowa 1970).
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also New Rider, 480 F.2d at 698.
69. 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970),
70. Id. at 1285.
71. Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1263 (7th Cir. 1970).
72. New Rider, 480 F.2d at 698; see Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 261 (10th Cir. 1971).
See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
73. Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir. 1968).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 702, 703; see also Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding
that personal freedoms not absolute, and must yield when they intrude upon freedom of others);
New Rider, 480 F.2d at 698 (holding that First Amendment rights are not absolute, and courts
must balance them against a compelling public interest).
76. Zeller v. Donegal Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 606 (3d Cir. 1975); see also
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that the structure can be expanded at the school official's discretion. Indeed,
such officials have been given broad powers of enforcement and regulation
of student activities.' "IT]hey must control all student conduct which bears
some substantial relationship to the educational function."' However, school

officials may not act autocratically or exercise absolute authority over
students.w
In formulating their rules and regulations, school officials are charged with
ensuring such rules do not operate in an arbitrary or capricious manner.'
Such school officials will have the burden of showing the necessity of
infringing upon students' freedom.8 ' When making a showing against a

personal freedom, the school officials must affirmatively show the controlling
interest of the State, or it must be self-evident to justify an intrusion.' Many

courts have required a "substantial burden of justification" for the
regulation.'

The United States Supreme Court has stated that a governmental regulation
is substantially justified if: (1) it is within the constitutional power of the

government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
(3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest 5'

In justifying school regulations and their reasonableness, the evidence must
show that school officials could reasonably foresee a "substantial disruption
of, or a material interference with the educational process."' If school
officials are unable to show any reasonable relationship of the regulation to

the conduct of the educational process, or the functions of the school, and also
show that the sanctions imposed were for the purpose of alleviating a

Sims v. Colfax Community Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485,487 (S.D. Iowa 1970) (stating that rules
and regulations governing student conduct are required to maintain an orderly educational
program).
77. Berryman v. Hien, 329 F. Supp. 616 (D. Idaho 1971); see also Sims, 307 F. Supp. at 487
(stating that school officials are of necessity given "a wide latitude of discretion in formulating
rules and regulations" to control student conduct).
78. Berryman, 329 F. Supp. at 620.
79. Sims, 307 F. Supp. at 487.
80. Valdes v. Monroe Cobnty Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 325 F. Supp. 572, 575 (S.D. Fla.
1971).
81. Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069,
1075 (8th Cir. 1971).
82. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir. 1970).
83. Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49, 52 (7th Cir. 1974); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702,
705 (W.D. Wis. 1969). But see Zeller v. Donegal Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 608 (3d
Cir. 1975) (holding that school officials need not demonstrate an outweighing state interest).
84. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
85. Berryman v. Hien, 329 F. Supp. 616, 619 (D. Idaho 1971).
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substantial interference with that educational process, then such regulations
have been deemed arbitrary by some courts and therefore unreasonable.
School officials have attempted to show- an interference with the
educational process by claiming that long hair tends to disrupt school activity
and distracts teachers and students," and that long hair "has endangered the
conduct of normal activities at [the school] which require a fairly strict form
of discipline.' One form of disruption may be possible violence from other
students.' However, threats of violence against one asserting a constitutional
right are not a justification for the imposition of state sanctions.' The court
in Westly v. Ross?' held: "An undifferentiated fear of disturbance is not
sufficient to override significant individual freedom afforded by the Federal
Constitution."' Such an argument has more merit if school officials have
tried, and failed, to silence those persons actually engaged in disruptive
conduct.'
A showing of the ineffectiveness of normal disciplinary
procedures may be required.'
Hair rules can be upheld where school officials demonstrate an actual
disruption from harassment, obscene language, fights, and obscene
appearance. 5 However, sanctioning the long-haired student for the conduct
of others is clearly inappropriate, and a majority of courts will not recognize
this type of conduct as "disruption" caused by the prohibited activity; wearing
long hair.' The disruption must be caused by the hair itself: health or safety
problems, distractions, or actual disturbance by the student with long hair. 7
Safety is an often used argument by school officials. Long hair could get
caught in a power tool in shop class or be ignited by a bunsen burner in a
science lab.9" Such arguments generally fail, since the hazards averred to by
school officials are easily remedied by protective devices such as hairnets,
headbands, and the like."
Some officials attempt to argue that students with long hair perform more
poorly academically then do those students in compliance with the hair
regulation. School boards may attempt to defend the regulation by claiming

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 620.
Brick v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (D. Colo. 1969).
Seal v. Mertz, 338 F. Supp. 945, 950 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
Crews v. Clones, 432 F.2d 1259, 1265 (7th Cir. 1970); Berryman, 329 F. Supp. at 619.
Id.
305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969).
Id. at 711.
Crews, 432 F.2d at 1265.
Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972).
Sims v. Colfax Community Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485, 487 (S.D. Iowa 1970).
Turley v. Adel Community Sch. Dist., 322 F. Supp. 402, 409 (S.D. Iowa 1971).
Id.
Massie, 455 F.2d at 783.
Id.; e.g., Seal v. Mertz, 338 F. Supp. 945. 950 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Massie, 455 F.2d at 783.
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that an academic disruption of the learning experience has occurred."
Courts see large evidentiary problems with this argument and usually give it
no weight.'
When balancing a school regulation against a personal liberty, courts
should carefully consider the regulation's purpose. Tenuous claims of
disruption turn schools into the "enclaves of totalitarianism,""' and
regulations should only further the educational process. 3 In balancing a
school regulation against a personal liberty, perhaps the only consideration
should be: (1) does the regulation significantly further the educational process,
and (2) will absence of the regulation cause substantial harm to school
functions.
III. Alabama & Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. Trustees
of the Big Sandy School District
A. Facts Leading to the Case
The plaintiffs, Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas (the Tribe)" 4 and
twelve Native American students, brought suit seeking a preliminary
injunction and challenging a school dress code promulgated by the Big Sandy
School District. These plaintiffs contended that the dress code, as enforced,
violated various First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, including the right
to free exercise of religion. Defendants named in the suit were the Trustees,
Superintendent, and Principal of the Big Sandy Independent School
District."' The challenged regulation was a portion of the dress code which
restricted the hair length of all male students in the school district." The
reasons given for enforcement of the dress code were to: create an
educational atmosphere, minimize disruptions, promote respect for authority,
prepare students for the workplace, and ensure that students involved in
extracurricular activities provide a favorable impression for the District."

100. Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1974).
101. Turley, 322 F. Supp. at 406, 407.

102. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
103. Turley, 322 F. Supp. at 406.
104. As of August 18, 1987, the Tribe is once again a federally recognized sovereign nation
in accordance with 25 U.S.C. §§ 731-737 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
105. Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v. Trustees of the Big Sandy Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp.
1319, 1323 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
106. Id. The regulation read: "Boys hair should be of reasonable length and style so as not
[to] interfere with the instructional program. Boys hair should [be] no longer than the top of a

standard dress collar." d
107. Id.at 1323-24. The reasons given for the regulation were:
a. To create an atmosphere conducive to learning and to minimize disruptions
attributable to personal appearance, conduct, grooming, and hygiene, and attire.
b. To foster an attitude of respect for authority, and to prepare students to enter
the workplace, which often has rules regarding dress, conduct and appearance.
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At the beginning of the 1992 school year, one plaintiff, a seventeen-yearold tenth grader, was told by the principal of Big Sandy to cut his hair.'
The student did not comply and was placed in 'in-school detention." Four
other students, also plaintiffs to the action, were threatened with discipline for
their long hairy These four cut their hair after being told they could not
return to school until they complied. Throughout September 1992, five other
Native American students were subjected to in-school detention for wearing
their hair long. The Native American students were the only ones disciplined
for violation of the dress code prohibition on long hair."0
In-school detention was supervised by a teacher's aide, who gave some
assistance to the students. The suspended students were not given regular
instruction, but met with the regular teachers during scheduled conference
periods, and could request assistance from the teachers."'
The plaintiffs generally fell behind the other students academically while
suspended. Testimony was heard from one student who worked hard to keep
up, while another was called "a poor student whether he was in in-school
detention or not."" The student plaintiffs were allowed to return to regular
classes after the court issued a temporary restraining order."3
B. Facts Presentedat the PreliminaryInjunction Hearing
At the preliminary injunction hearing held on January 4, 1993, an expert
for the plaintiffs" 4 gave testimony about the Tribe's history and religious
beliefs. Many southeastern tribes have traditionally worn long hair as a
symbol of moral and spiritual strength." ' Hair was sacred, and to cut it
involved a complicated procedure. To cut one's hair was viewed as the
equivalent of cutting off a body part."6 Usually, hair was cut only as a sign
of mourning upon the death of a close family member. Hair provided spiritual
protction, and to cut it at any other time would subject one's body to
invasion by witchcraft."7

c. To ensure that the conduct and grooming of students who represent the
District in extracurricular activities create a favorable impression for the District
and the Community.

Id.
108. Id. at 1324.

109. Id.
110. IU
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. The expert was Him] F. Gregory, Ph.D., an anthropologist specializing in
southastern Native American tribes.
1 5. Big Sandy, 817 F. Supp. at 1324.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1325.
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The expert further testified about a lack of detailed information concerning
the Tribe's beliefs."' Such beliefs are the property of the Tribe's members,
and to share them with outsiders is generally considered taboo." 9 The Tribe
has historically practiced animism, where everything in nature is believed
sacred and filled with a spirit. Shamanism formed part of the beliefs, with
"medicine men" taking responsibility for healing people, controlling events,
and divining the future."
Christianity came to the Tribe during the 1890s in the form of Presbyterian
missionaries. The missionaries discouraged manifestations of traditional
The early 1900s brought a
beliefs, such as stick-ball and dancing.'
movement to pressure the Tribe to assimilate into Caucasian culture, including
pressure put upon Native American men to cut their hair short, in imitation
of the hairstyles worn by white men at that time.'
To the Tribe, Christianity and their own beliefs were compatible, and tribal
members continued to practice traditional beliefs. The overall religion of the
Tribe encompassed every aspect of one's life, and was not confined to formal,
scheduled religious services held in a church or temple." The modern Tribe
encourages education and the continuation and preservation of traditional
culture to the extent possible. The Tribe's language survives, as do such
practices as ceremonial dances, and dance competitions, which are expressions
of Native American traditions and religion."
Young Native Americans across North America have combined traditional
belief into a "pan-tribal"'" reinvigoration of traditional culture and
heritage.Y A uniform belief system has emerged in place of a revival of
each tribe's individual religion. One facet of this new movement is the
wearing of long hair.27
At the conclusion of the expert testimony, the court heard testimony from
student plaintiffs about their beliefs concerning long hair, and its significance
to them as part of their religion and cultural heritage."5 Such beliefs
included a refusal to cut their hair, except when a family member dies, a

118. Big Sandy, 817 F. Supp. at 1326.
119. Id. at 1325.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. But see Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972), where the court noted that
"many of the founding fathers, as well as General Grant and General Lee, wore their hair... in
a style comparable to that adopted by plaintiffs." Id. at 780. "Substantially every president of the
United States serving before Woodrow Wilson would also have been in violation of this [hair
length] regulation." Id. at 780 n.1.
123. Big Sandy, 817 F. Supp. at 1325.

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.

127. I1&
128. Id.
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belief that hair was a body part, which, if cut, would have to be searched for
in the afterlife, and a releasing of the spirit during ceremonial dances."
Both the parents of the students and the Tribe approved of the wearing of
long hair because of its religious significance. The tribal counsel testified to
their desire to preserve their cultural heritage and about concern for their
young people, who were feeling isolated in school as a result of the problems
caused by the hair issue.' Some disparity was shown between the parents'
beliefs and those of the students."' While some parents practiced
Christianity and did not consider long hair spiritually significant, they fully
supported their children's belief in the spiritual aspects of hair, and encouraged
respect of their tribal heritage and traditions.13
The Tribe attempted to get the school board to change its dress code to
allow Native American students to wear their hair long.' At a board
meeting, one student stated that he desired to wear his hair long because of
his religious beliefs, buta board member responded by telling him that long
hair went out with the hippies."T At the next board meeting, two weeks
later, the board voted to leave the dress code unchanged.'
Testimony was presented by some teachers about some disciplinary
problems which had arisen since the entry of the temporary restraining order,
which allowed students in violation of the dress code to return to regular
classes. The problems included tardiness, student responses in AlabamaCoushatta language, racial epithets, and social polarization between Native
American students and other students. However, a trustee and the
superintendent testified that there were no significant discipline problems in
the district."
C. Conclusions of Law

The plaintiffs were seeking a preliminary injunction for the alleged
violation of their civil rights. The allegations included First Amendment
violations of the plaintiffs' right to free exercise of religion and free speech,
and Fourteenth Amendment violations of plaintiffs' right to equal protection
and due process. Plaintiffs also asserted a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.'"

129. Id. at 1326.

130. Id,
131. Id.

132. Id.
113. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1326-27.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1327. The findings of the court concerning the constitutional issues are discussed
infra. The § 1983 claim will not be discussed, nor will other considerations and holdings in this
case, including the Tribes standing as parens patriae, the necessary showings required to get a
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1. The Right To Wear Long Hair
The Big Sandy court began its constitutional analysis by stating that school

boards must perform their functions within the bill of rights. 3 The court
cited Karr v. Schmidt,'39 which held that there is no constitutionally

protected right to wear one's hair in a public high school in the length and
style that suits the wearer.'" However, language taken from Karr suggests
that federal court intervention into local school affairs is appropriate when
fundamental rights are at stake.'
2. Free Exercise of Religion
The Big Sandy court noted that an infringement of fundamental rights was

alleged by plaintiffs. The United States Supreme Court has held that states
may impose restrictions and regulations which they may have a "rational

basis" for adopting. 42 Such regulations may not violate due process.
However, the freedom of worship may not be infringed on these "slender

grounds."'43 The freedom of religion may be restricted only to prevent a
grave and immediate danger to state interests.'" Since an infringement of

a fundamental
right had allegedly occurred, the Big Sandy court distinguished
14
Karr. 5

a) Sincerity
The Big Sandy court stated that plaintiffs must show a sincerely held
religious belief to establish their claim that a regulation violates their First

Amendment right to free exercise of religion." To determine sincerity, the
factfinder is not to delve into questions of "religious verity or the
reasonableness of the belief."'47 The beliefs themselves need not be

preliminary injunction, official immunity of school officials, and attorney's fees.
138. Big Sandy, 817 F. Supp. at 1328 (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette
319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
139. 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972).
140. Id. at 615. Karr represents the extreme view in long hair cases. The court found no
communicative intent, id. at 613, no privacy right, or invasion thereof, id. at 614, no significant
liberty associated with long hair, and that any interference with that liberty is temporary and
inconsequential, id. at 615. Further, the court was determined not to hear any more cases on this
subject, stating "the federal judiciary has urgent tasks to perform. . . ." Id. at 618. The court
declared a per se rule that public school grooming regulations are constitutionally valid, and that
future complaints alleging the constitutional invalidity of a high school hair regulation should be
immediately dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Id. at 617, 618.
141. Big Sandy, 817 F. Supp. at 1328.
142. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
143. Id.
144.. Id.
145. Big Sandy, 817 F. Supp. at 1328.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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acceptable, consistent, or logical to warrant First Amendment protection. 4"
Whether such beliefs are reasonable or not is of no consequence.'
To determine whether an issue is of "religion," and therefore entitled to
Firt Amendment protection, courts should consider orthodox concepts, such
as belief in a supreme deity and a purpose for human existence.'" Courts
should also consider other nontraditional characteristics if the belief system
addresses fundamental questions of the nature of reality."' Although the
Native American Indian movement might appear "nebulous and unstructured,"
the court nevertheless held that it was a religion entitled to First Amendment
protection."
Even if the wearing of long hair is not a fundamental tenet of Native
American religion, the practice will still be protected if it is deeply rooted in
reli:-ious belief.'" The court found that the Native American religion was
not exclusive." Therefore, plaintiffs could still have a sincerely held
religious belief in the sacredness of long hair and still, without contradiction,
participate in other religions such as Christianity.
b) The School's Interest in Regulating HairLength
After sincerity of the religious belief is shown, the burden shifts to the
state to show that an unusually important governmental goal is advanced by
the regulation, and that an exemption would substantially hinder that goal."'
The Big Sandy court then analyzed the appropriate standard of review to use
when regulating conduct which is a religious practice or belief. If a
compelling state interest in protecting public heath and safety though its
criminal statutes is challenged, the state need not employ the "least restrictive
means" of regulating that conduct."
The Big Sandy court discussed Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith'" and whether strict scrutiny
necessitated by the least restrictive means standard or the compelling state
interests standard should be applied to a free exercise claim. The court

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. (citing Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)).
Id. at 1329.
Id.
Id.
Id.

153. Id. (citing Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975)).
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 1329, 1330.
Id. at 1330.
Id.
494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith rejected the "least restrictive means" test when reviewing

a challenge to a criminal statute which was facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied. The
query in Big Sandy was whether a free exercise claim, standing alone, in a civil context, should
be subject to only a rational basis review; there was no clear precedent in the Fifth Circuit on the
level of scrutiny to be applied to independent free exercise challenges. Id.
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determined that when the claim is brought in a civil setting, the least
restrictive means standard should be used."' To apply Smith to every
free exercise challenge, whether in the civil or criminal context,
would be a gross aberration from decades of established Supreme
Court precedent in the First Amendment area. Moreover it would
represent the erosion if not the absolute obliteration of one of the
most basic principles our Founders . . .sought to establish
through the Bill of Rights - the free exercise of religion as a
fundamental right of the new American democracy."3 9
All of this analysis was unnecessary, since the Big Sandy court then stated
that plaintiffs had presented a "hybrid claim"; that is, a claim alleging that in
addition to the free exercise claim, another constitutional right had also been
burdened by the regulation. When such a hybrid claim is presented, the state
will be held to a higher standard, and be required to show more than a mere
"reasonable relation to a valid secular state purpose to sustain the validity of
the regulation over First Amendment concerns.""W
A survey of cases involving grooming regulations in the prison setting
shows that courts noted a higher state interest in regulating the grooming of
prisoners. Yet those courts still held that there were indeed less restricting
means of achieving those state interests than the hair length regulation in
question.' Since the Trustees of the Big Sandy School District had failed
to show that the objectives of discipline, fostering iespect, and projecting the
proper image to the community were achieved by valid means, the court held
that alternatives which do not unduly burden the plaintiffs' sincerely held
religious belief should be sought.'"
3. Free Speech
The plaintiffs asserted that their long hair was a communicative activity to
a Native American and is protected by the Free Speech Clause. Once again,
the court distinguished Karr, since plaintiffs in Karr presented no facts
showing that wearing long hair is a form of expressive activity.'6 Plaintiffs
in Big Sandy had presented compelling evidence that long hair in Native
American culture was symbolic.'" The court compared this "silent, passive

158. Big Sandy,817 F.Supp.at 1331.
159. Id. at 1331, 1332 (citation omitted).
160. Id. at 1332 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 881).
161. Id. For a discussion on Native American prisoners' rights and prison grooming
regulations, see William Norman, Note, Native American Inmates and Prison Grooming
Regulations: Today's Justified Scalps: Iron Eyes v.Henry, 18 Am.INDIAN L. REv. 191 (1993).
162. Big Sandy, 817 F.Supp. at1333.
163. Id.

164. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1994

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

expression of... faith and heritage"'" to the black armbands used to protest
the Vietnam War, worn by plaintiffs in Tinker." Therefore, the plaintiffs'
wearing of long hair was a protected activity, and the regulation as enforced,
violated the Free Speech Clause."7

4. Right of Parents To Direct Their Children's Upbringing
The right of parents to participate and direct their children's education and
religious upbringing is a firmly established constitutional doctrine."" Parents
and fellow tribal plaintiffs fully supported the students' decision to wear long
hair. Plaintiffs claimed that the regulation unduly burdened the parental right
to instill respect for Native American tradition and religion and the right to
guide these youth's religious beliefs. The Big Sandy court held that this issue
was a valid constitutional claim." The lack of analysis from the court
suggests either a strong claim on the part of the plaintiffs or a lack of
rationale to justify the court's opinion.
5. Due Process
i) ProceduralDue Process
Students have a legitimate claim of entitlement to public school
education.'" A student's- right to be free from any deprivation of liberty or
property without due process of law is implicated when that student is
suspended. Students must be afforded notice before they are suspended
from school for a lengthy time." Students are entitled to be heard so that
they can argue for leniency or special consideration. Here, there was no
evidence that notice was given to the students placed in in-school detention,
nor were the students given the opportunity to be heard. This lack of
procedure was found by the Big Sandy court to violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
b) Substantive Due Process
Plaintiffs also asserted a substantive due process claim, that the punishment
imposed on them was disproportionate to their offense and that the hair length
regulation had no rational basis. For a violation of substantive due process to

165. Id.

166. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
167. Big Sandy, 817 F. Supp. at 1334.
168. Id.
1.59.
Id.
170. Coss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975).
171. Big Sandy, 817 P.Supp. at 1335.
1"72. Id.
173. Id.
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occur, action by school officials must have been arbitrary and capricious."
The suspensions are valid if: (1) not made in bad faith; (2) fair procedures are
used; and (3) there was no substantial departure from accepted academic
norms demonstrating a lack of professional judgment."5
Here, the court held that a substantive due process violation could occur
during a lengthy period of suspension, which results in a learning
disadvantage by the suspended students.'76 However, plaintiffs in this case
were only subjected to in-school detention for six weeks, until the temporary
restraining order released the students. The punishment was not
unreasonable." Also, the Big Sandy court, following Karr on this issue,
held that the regulation was rationally related to the goals of creating an
atmosphere conducive to learning, minimizing disruptions, and fostering an
attitude of respect.'
6. Equal Protection
Finally, plaintiffs alleged that they were arbitrarily denied educational
benefits because of their race, through enforcement of the dress code. The
Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of equal protection requires similar
treatment under the law for similarly situated persons. ' The hair length
regulation was racially neutral, with no group or individual singled out. If
such a neutral law results in disproportionate treatment of a racial minority,
it may violate the Equal Protection Clause.'" The disproportionate impact
must be traced to a discriminatory purpose. It must also be shown that a
decision maker "selected a particular cause of action at least in part because
of, and not simply in spite of, the adverse impact it would have on an
identifiable group.'8 '
The Big Sandy court found that the defendants had presented reasonable
nondiscriminatory reasons for the enforcement of the dress code."s The
plaintiffs had not disputed the validity of the goals underlying the dress code.
Here, the court used a rational basis test, as allowed absent evidence of
discriminatory purpose underlying a racially neutral regulation." "Any
conceivable state purpose" served by the regulation in this situation would
result in a finding of its validity.' The hair regulation in this situation did

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1336.
Id.
Id.
Id.

181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. (citing United States v. Galloway 951 F.2d 64, 65 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Cunningham v. Beavers, 858 F.2d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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not deny plaintiffs of equal protection because of a finding of legitimate
purpose."
In conclusion, the court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the
defendants from enforcing the school district's hair regulation against Native
American Students." Plaintiffs had presented a number of constitutional
claims, which the court recognized as valid. Big Sandy was decided correctly,
but the reasoning employed by the court merits further analysis.
D. Analysis of the Case
The plaintiffs in Big Sandy presented claims that were unavailable (or not
presented) by plaintiffs in previous long hair cases. The claim that the hair
length regulation violated the plaintiffs' free exercise of religion and their
parental rights undeniably tipped the scales in their favor. Indeed, the
allegations are lumped together, resulting in a weighty hybrid claim, to be
thrown on plaintiffs' side of the balancing test scales. Further, the hybrid
claim results in a different scale being used, that being the one already
weighted in their favor: strict scrutiny to ensure the least restrictive means
were used in controlling the prohibited conduct.
. The Sincerity Test

The Big Sandy court stated that the plaintiffs must show a "sincerely held
religious belief," and the court cited Professor Laurence Tribe's Constitutional
Law Treatise.' The test used by the court in Big Sandy is taken from
United States v. Ballard,' a mail-fraud prosecution in which the defendants
had solicited money by representing themselves as divine messengers. The
Supreme Court attempted to keep the inquiry into a party's religion as narrow
as possible. A jury could determine whether religious beliefs were sincerely
held but not whether they were true.'" Justice Jackson, in his dissent,
argued it was impossible to separate verity from sincerity when questioning
a religious belief.'9
Professor Tribe found merit in Justice Jackson's opinion when the
government is seeking to protect citizens from fraudulent religious claims,
"since protection is precisely what the Constitution put beyond the prosecutors
reach.''. Such an argument is less persuasive, Professor Tribe continued,
when individuals challenge a regulation and "seek special treatment from the

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id. at 1338.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12, at 1242 (2d cd, 1988).
322 U.S. 78 (1944).
Id. at 86, 87.
Id. at 92 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
TRIBE, supra note 187, § 14-12, at 1245.
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state, because the whole community .. .suffers from the dilution of a
governmental program.""
To force the plaintiffs to show a sincerely held religious belief in a case
like Big Sandy is clearly inappropriate. Violation of the challenged hair length
regulation did not interfere with the rights of other students, nor did it
interfere with the education process. 93 Therefore there was no "dilution of
a governmental program."'" Even if a governmental entity is lawfully
exercising its authority to protect a state interest, there must be a grave and
immediate danger to that interest before a restriction on one's religion can
occur.'95 Forcing one to show the sincerity of their beliefs could result in a
restriction upon those beliefs if the believer cannot "pass" the test.
Professor Tribe further stated that the rights protected by the Free Exercise
Clause may be endangered by "any but the most minimal inquiry" into the
sincerity of one's religious beliefs.' Professor Tribe argued that if religion
is being used as a "completely fraudulent cloak," extrinsic evidence showing
such fraud must be considered.
For example, the sincerity inquiry has
been used when evidence exists to show that the religion is being used as a
pretext.'
While Professor Tribe believes any test of sincerity must be limited to a
neutral sort,'" he certainly does not go far enough. The sincerity test should
only be used in appropriate cases. Limiting the test itself is not enough. When
the test is actually applied must also be limited. The court in Big Sandy
recognized the importance of the Free Exercise Clause and the need for strict
scrutiny by courts reviewing regulations that may violate that right.'
However, the court added credibility to the sincerity test by using it. The
sincerity test is, at best, difficult to apply, and an attempt to prescribe
orthodox beliefs and weed out unacceptable religions at worst. Despite all of
its noble rhetoric about the Free Exercise Clause, the Big Sandy court still
performed the role of deciding whether a religion was valid or not. The Big
Sandy court examined the beliefs, and heard "expert" testimony on Native
American religion. The court then decided that the students did really believe

192. Id.
193. Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v. Trustees of the Big Sandy Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp.
1319, 1334 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
194. TRIBE, supra note 187, § 14-12, at 1245.
195. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
196. TRIBE, supra note 187, § 14-12, at 1242.
197. Id.
198. Dobkin v. District of Columbia, 194 A.2d 657 (D.C. 1963) (denying exemption from
court appearance on Saturday to attorney who actually went to his office and worked on
Saturdays, despite his claim that he was a Sabbatarian).
199. TRIBE, supra note 187, § 14-12, at 1246.
200. Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v. Trustees of the Big Sandy Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp.
1319, 1330-33 (E.D. Tex. 1993).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1994

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

what they had claimed to believe, and put a judicial stamp of approval on
their religion. The sincerity test should only be used in cases involving
criminal statutes, and only after the state has presented compelling evidence
to show that the sincerity of a religious belief should be questioned. The
implementation of a "presumption of faith" would help safeguard the religious
beliefs of citizens. These measures would help ensure that the questions of
"Do you really believe?" and "Is this really a religion?" are asked only in the
rarest of circumstances.
The Big Sandy court rightly held that the wearing of long hair for religious
reasons is protected, even though it is not a fundamental tenet of Native
American religion. The practice need only be a "deeply rooted belief."'
However, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to show a deeply rooted belief,
since courts consider the sincerity of the specific plaintiffs beliefs and should
not consider the sincerity of the "average" believer. What is fundamental and
deeply rooted to one member of a religious group may not be to a majority
of other believers. The use of the sincerity test should be severely limited,
bolh in scope and in frequency of use. Putting one's religious beliefs under
scrutiny by using the sincerity test offers too much opportunity for abuse.
Courts must not be permitted to use an expansive sincerity test in all
situations involving religion and state regulations.
2. Free Speech
The Big Sandy court took an unusual step in comparing long hair with the
armbands worn by plaintiffs in Tinker. Most courts have not found Tinker
persuasive as to this issue, nor have they found long hair a form of
speech. The difference in Big Sandy was the fact that Native Americans
were "communicating" to each other, and to the world in general, that they
were believers, and promoters of Native American culture and heritage. These
message seemed specific enough for the court to view the long hair as
symbolic speech.
3. ParentalRights
As stated supra, the plaintiffs' allegation that parental rights were burdened
by the hair-length regulation helped tip the balance in plaintiffs' favor. The
fact that Native American parents were instilling into their children pride in
their culture and religion made a convincing argument that parental rights
were being subrogated.

201. Id. at 1329.
202. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
203. See supra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
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4. Due Process
Here, the Big Sandy court took another look at the regulation they
previously stated to be unconstitutional. However, the court was now looking
without its "strict scrutiny" magnifying glass, and instead used dark "rational
basis" sunglasses. It seems absurd for the court to come to diametrically
opposed conclusions when looking at the same regulation. Notice that the Big
Sandy court held that defendants "have failed to show that the restriction on
hair length is a valid means of achieving its objectives of maintaining
discipline . . . ." The court then stated the inverse by holding that the
regulation "is rationally related to the legitimate goals of creating an
atmosphere conducive to learning. .. "'
Apparently, even if the regulation is not a valid means of achieving
objectives, it will still pass Fourteenth Amendment muster if it is rationally
related to those objectives. The court does not state how "rational" or how
closely "related" the regulation must be. Therefore, this certainly provides a
wide latitude to courts to uphold regulations of a wide variety.
Conclusion
Students challenging a hair length regulation can prevail if enough rights
are burdened by the regulation. Simply wearing long hair as a personal
preference may be a right, but it will likely not be considered a First
Amendment right. Native American students can have an especially important
claim. To such students, the wearing of long hair can have a religious
significance and can be regarded as representative of pride in their culture and
traditions. Parents have a right to encourage and supervise that pride. Such
long hair can have communicative intent, particularly within the Native
American paradigm. Big Sandy reached the correct result. However, the
court's reasoning was misguided in several significant respects. The courts of
this nation must be limited as to their inquiries into the religious beliefs of its
citizens, especially Native American citizens belonging to a non-mainstream
or minority religion. The right of Native American students in public schools
to wear long hair should not be infringed.

204. Big Sandy, 817 F. Supp. at 1333.
205. Id. at 1335.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1994

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss1/8

